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3.1  Introduction 
A number of East Asian and Latin American countries have been the recipi- 
ents of a large portion of total international capital flows to developing coun- 
tries, both in the late seventies to early eighties and in the early nineties. These 
inflows have  financed persistent current account imbalances, as well as the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. The Mexican crisis and the recent 
Asian crisis have shown, however, that abrupt reversals in international capital 
flows can cause severe problems for economies with large external imbalances 
and have  spurred renewed  interest in the question of  current account sus- 
tainability. A number of recent studies have focused on potential early warning 
indicators in predicting exchange rate, financial, and balance-of-payments cri- 
ses.’ This chapter contributes to this literature by examining the sustainability 
of current account deficits in three East Asian countries (Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand) and three Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) 
in the early eighties and in the early nineties. Having been originally written 
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in early 1996, it does not include the 1997-98  Asian crisis, but it nevertheless 
provides some links between these events and the paper’s findings. The meth- 
odology builds on Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996); this study emphasizes in 
particular regional aspects and stresses the differences between the experi- 
ences of the early eighties and those of the early nineties. 
A remarkable feature of the experience of highly indebted East Asian coun- 
tries in the early eighties was that (with the exception of the Philippines) they 
avoided the debt crisis that instead affected a large number of Latin American 
countries. Sachs (1985) argued that differences in external conditions could 
not account for the differences in outcomes across the two regions and empha- 
sized instead the importance of differences in exchange rate policy and trade 
openness. A decade later, some of the countries that experienced severe exter- 
nal imbalances in the early eighties have been running large current account 
deficits again. Given the differences in the macroeconomic policy stance and 
in the type of  financing of these deficits, as well as the similarities in the ex- 
change rate regime, it is interesting to compare these more recent episodes 
with those of the early eighties in order to draw inferences about what factors 
make a country that runs persistent external imbalances vulnerable to a crisis. 
Given the growth record of  the East Asian countries we consider over the 
past 25 years, a natural question to ask is whether their macroeconomic and 
structural features make them less likely to experience a reversal in interna- 
tional capital flows. In our sample, East Asian countries are characterized by a 
higher degree of openness and by higher levels of savings and investment than 
Latin American countries. In our analysis we provide arguments as to why 
these macroeconomic and structural features can (but need not) enhance the 
ability of an economy to sustain protracted current account imbalances, and 
we highlight the importance of  other factors, such as the degree of exchange 
rate flexibility and domestic financial fragility. 
Another important question that we address in this chapter is whether the 
composition of capital inflows plays an important role in determining the sus- 
tainability of external imbalances, There is a significant difference in the com- 
position of capital flows between the late seventies to early eighties and the 
early nineties. In  the earlier period, during which most of  the countries we 
consider had relatively closed capital accounts, capital flows  to developing 
countries took mainly the form of official lending and commercial bank loans, 
while in the latter period, characterized by increased capital account openness, 
portfolio flows and foreign direct investment played a major role (see, e.g., 
FemAndez-Arias and Montiel 1996 for an overview and Calvo, Leidennan, and 
Reinhart 1994 and Corbo and HernAndez 1996 for a comparison between the 
experiences of East Asia and Latin America). 
Finally, we examine the implications of  differences across decades in the 
domestic macroeconomic policy stance and the external environment (in par- 
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account deficits. There is an  ongoing debate on whether the resumption of 
large capital flows to several developing countries (among which those in our 
sample) in the early nineties has been driven mainly by  “pull” factors, such 
structural reforms and improved macroeconomic policy management, or by 
“push” factors, such as the low level of real interest rates and weak economic 
activity in OECD countries in the early nineties (see, e.g., Calvo et al. 1993; 
Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi 1993; FernLndez-Arias 1996). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses sol- 
vency and sustainability of current account deficits in the context of standard 
intertemporal models of current account determination, in which the supply of 
foreign funds is infinitely elastic at the world interest rate. Section 3.3 exam- 
ines key determinants of the supply of foreign funds in the presence of capital 
market imperfections, in particular asymmetric information. Section 3.4  de- 
scribes the country episodes. Section 3.5 presents a cross-country comparison 
of potential sustainability indicators, related to macroeconomic and structural 
features of the countries, as well as to the composition of external liabilities 
and the magnitude of external shocks. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2  Intertemporal Solvency 
The current account balance, CA, is the change in the net foreign asset posi- 
tion of a country. In an accounting framework, it is defined as follows: 
(1)  CA, = c - F,  =  I: + r&  - C, -  I, - G, 
= s,, + s,, -  I,, 
where F is the stock of  net foreign assets, Y is GDP,  r is the world interest 
rate (assumed for simplicity to be constant), C is private consumption, G is 
government current expenditure, I is total investment (private and public), S, 
is private savings, and S, is public savings. As the second equality in equation 
(1) shows, the current account balance is also equal to the difference between 
the economy’s total savings and its total investment. Current account imbal- 
ances are a vehicle for the intertemporal allocation of resources.* 
We  assume in this section that capital mobility is perfect, so that the net 
supply of foreign funds is infinitely elastic at the world interest rate level, post- 
poning the discussion of imperfections in international capital markets to sec- 
tion 3.3. We define intertemporal solvency as a situation in which the country 
as a whole and each economic unit within the country, including the govern- 
ment, obey their respective intertemporal budget constraints. The basic sol- 
2. This section draws on Milesi-Ferretti  and Rain (1996). For a more complete discussion of 
the intertemporal approach to the current account, see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) and 
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vency requirement can be expressed by iterating forward the difference equa- 
tion (1) and imposing the standard transversality condition that the present 
value of net indebtedness in the indefinite future has to tend to zero: 
The right-hand side of equation (2) is simply the present discounted value of 
future trade surpluses (deficits), which must be equal to the present level of 
foreign debt (assets) in order for the country to be solvent. 
Solvency, a long-run concept, clearly depends on the evolution of the macro- 
economic aggregates on the right-hand side of  equation (2). This equation, 
while valid in an accounting sense, has limited operational use because it does 
not incorporate any behavioral assumption and thus does not impose any struc- 
ture on future events or policy decisions. Indeed, if future trade surpluses are 
sufficiently large, solvency is always ensured. Therefore, researchers have at- 
tempted to define a baseline for private agents’ behavior and for future policy 
actions. With regard to private agents’ behavior, it is typically assumed that 
they aim at smoothing their consumption stream, consistently with maximiza- 
tion of a concave utility function. With regard to future policy actions, in the 
case of public sector solvency the baseline has typically been established by 
postulating a continuation into the indefinite future of the current policy stance 
and no change in the relevant features of the macroeconomic environment (see, 
e.g., Corsetti and Roubini 1991). This gives rise to the notion of “sustainabil- 
ity”-the  current policy stance is sustainable if its continuation in the indefi- 
nite future does not violate solvency (budget) constraints. The definition of 
sustainability based on solvency considerations is simpler for fiscal imbal- 
ances, given that these can be associated (at least to some degree) with direct 
policy decisions about taxation and government expenditure. Defining sus- 
tainability is more complex in the case of current account imbalances, given 
that these reflect the interaction between savings and investment decisions of 
the government and domestic private agents, as well as the lending decisions 
of foreign investors. While government decisions can, to a first approximation, 
be taken as given, private sector decisions are going to depend on investors’ 
expectations about future government actions. Furthermore, a key  relative 
price-the  exchange rate-is  a forward-looking variable that by definition de- 
pends on the future evolution of policy variables. 
The question of whether current account imbalances are sustainable can be 
reformulated as follows. Is a continuation of  the current policy stance andor 
of  the present private sector behavior going to entail the need for a “drastic” 
policy shift (such as, e.g., a sudden policy tightening causing a large recession) 
or to lead to a “crisis” (such as an exchange rate collapse leading to an inability 
to service external obligations)? If the answer is yes, we have a case of unsus- 
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a domestic or an external shock that causes a shift in domestic and foreign 
investors’ confidence and a reversal of  international capital  Note that 
the shift in foreign investors’ confidence may relate to their perception of  a 
country’s inability or unwillingness to meet its external obligations. 
What are the implications of the solvency condition for the long-run level 
of income and absorption? It is possible to impose some more “structure” on 
the condition for solvency by considering that for an economy to remain sol- 
vent, the ratio of external indebtedness to output cannot grow without bound. 
Assume that the domestic economy grows at a given rate y <  r,4 and let lower- 
case letters indicate ratios of  variables to GDP. Abstracting from changes in 
the real exchange rate, equation (1) can then be expressed as follows: 
(3) 
where tb is the trade balance. This expression simply says that changes in the 
ratio of foreign assets to GDP are driven by trade imbalances and by  a “debt 
dynamics” term proportional tof(r* -  y). This latter term rises with the world 
rate of  interest and falls with the rate of  growth of  the domestic economy. 
Consider now an economy in steady state, in which consumption, investment, 
and public expenditure are constant as a fraction of  GDP. The long-run net 
resource transfer (trade surplus) that an indebted country must undertake in 
order to keep the ratio of debt to output constant is determined by 
(4) 
In the presence of economic growth a country can sustain permanent current 
account deficits while remaining solvent even when the growth rate is below 
the world interest rate, provided these deficits are accompanied by sufficiently 
large trade surpluses. Clearly, if the long-run growth rate of  the economy is 
zero, the current account must be balanced in order for the ratio of  foreign 
liabilities (assets) to GDP to be constant. In this case, a country that is a debtor 
in the long run will have.to run a trade surplus, equal to -  rJ  to pay the interest 
on its external liabilities. The size of the net resource transfer implied by condi- 
tion (4) has been used as a simple measure of solvency in a number of studies. 
For example, Cohen (1996) considers the Mexican resource transfers (as a 
fraction of GDP) after the 1982 debt crisis as an “upper bound” on the feasible 
39.  tb  = 1 - i - c -  g  =  -f(r* - 
3. In  the  presence of uncertainty, definitions of solvency and  sustainability rely on expected 
values, implying that in some states of the world insolvency will occur. Under these circumstances, 
the issue becomes how likely the occurrence of a “bad” scenario is and how vulnerable a country 
is to external shocks. 
4. Otherwise, a country could play “Ponzi games” indefinitely-i.e.,  borrow to repay interest 
on its outstanding debt, without violating solvency conditions, as long as total indebtedness rises 
at a rate below the economy’s growth rate. This possibility, which can arise in a Samuelson-type 
overlapping generations model (see Gale 1973), implies that the economy follows a dynamically 
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resource transfers for heavily indebted countries, and he compares this magni- 
tude with each high-debt country’s resource transfer as defined by equation (4), 
in order to assess its solvency prospects (see also Cohen 1992). 
Two  main  approaches to  the empirical implementation of  intertemporal 
models of the current account have been used. The first approach emphasizes 
the consumption-smoothing role of the current account. Consider a small open 
economy under perfect capital mobility that takes the world interest rate as 
given. In the absence of adjustrnent costs, investment will be undertaken so as 
to equate the marginal product of  capital to the world interest rate in every 
period, regardless of the consumption profile. The latter will be determined by 
utility maximization considerations, subject to an intertemporal budget con- 
straint. Assume for simplicity that the consumption function takes a quadratic 
form and that the discount rate equals the real interest rate.5 In this case, it is 
easy to show that even in the presence of uncertainty the expected level of 
consumption will be fixed along the optimal path and will be a function of the 
expected present discounted value of future net output. It can thus be shown 
that current account deficits will reflect expected increases in future net output, 
Y -  I -  G (see, e.g., Ghosh and Ostry 1995). 
This relation between the current account and expected changes in net future 
output has been used as the basis for tests of current account behavior by Shef- 
frin and Woo (1990), Otto (1992), and Ghosh (1995) for a sample of industrial 
countries and by Ghosh and Ostry (1995) for developing countries. The basic 
idea is an application of Campbell’s (1987) methodology for testing the perma- 
nent income theory of consumption and consists in the estimation of a vector 
autoregression model linking the (detrended) current account and changes in 
net output to past values of the same variables. The current account needs to 
be detrended in order to control for the presence of long-run trends in foreign 
savings (see n. 5 below). The model implies that the current account should 
incorporate all available information for predicting future changes in net out- 
put, and therefore, the coefficient on past net output changes in the equation 
determining current net  output changes should be zero. The simple model 
sketched above allows one to construct a predicted current account path that 
can be compared with the actual one in order to gauge whether, according to 
the model, actual current account balances have been “excessive.” 
An alternative method of estimating an intertemporal model of current ac- 
count determination has been used by Glick and Rogoff (1995) and Leiderman 
and Razin (1991). The methodology consists in the determination from an in- 
tertemporal model with investment adjustment costs and perfect capital mobil- 
ity of  the predicted responses of  the investment and the current account to 
productivity shocks (global and country specific, temporary and permanent), 
as well as to other shocks, and in the subsequent estimation of  the model. 
5. The latter assumption is not innocuous: it implies the absence of a “consumption-tilting” term 
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While the presence of investment adjustment costs and stochastic productivity 
lends more realism to the model, the data requirements for this type of estima- 
tion have so far limited its application to industrial countries only. 
What is the relation between external solvency, current account sustainabil- 
ity, and “excessive” current account deficits? The concepts of  solvency and 
sustainability discussed earlier in this section are binary-a  country is either 
solvent or insolvent, and a current account deficit either sustainable or unsus- 
tainable-and  imply an increasing order of restrictiveness. The first concept, 
based on the intertemporal budget constraint, can accommodate a variety of 
future behavior patterns. The second is based on a continuation of the current 
policy stance and therefore imposes more structure on future behaviot6 The 
notion of excessive current account deficits provides instead a quantitative met- 
ric based on deviations from an optimal benchmark (structurally derived from 
a model under the assumption of perfect capital mobility and efficient financial 
markets). One problem in using this metric as a basis for evaluating how close 
to unsustainability is a given path of  current account imbalances is that its 
benchmark relies  on  the  absence of  capital market  imperfections; conse- 
quently, deviations from the benchmark can simply reflect the existence of 
liquidity constraints or other financial market imperfections. We  discuss how 
these imperfections can affect the supply of external funds in section 3.3; we 
do not, however, attempt to incorporate imperfect capital markets in an encom- 
passing intertemporal model. Instead, we rely on the insights of the theoretical 
discussion to examine the issue of sustainability of protracted current account 
imbalances following a nonstructural approach. We  can thus incorporate a 
broader set of theoretical considerations than those that can be accommodated 
in a structural approach using the state-of-the-art equilibrium models, at the 
cost of lacking the ability to provide a quantitative analysis of sustainability. 
3.3  Supply of External Funds and Debt Flows 
So far we have considered a world in which market imperfections such as 
asymmetric information, moral hazard, and absence of  bankruptcy arrange- 
ments do not play a role in shaping international borrowing and lending. These 
problems, however, are relevant, in particular for developing countries, typi- 
cally characterized by shallower financial markets and higher vulnerability to 
external shocks, such as changes in the terms of trade. A vast literature, mostly 
spawned by  the debt crisis experiences of  1982,7 has used imperfect capital 
market models to study how the equilibrium level of international lending de- 
pends on the form of creditor sanctions (including loss of reputation), the abil- 
ity of the borrower to make credible commitments (e.g., through investment), 
6.  Within the notion of sustainability, we can also include cases in which a timely reversal of 
7. For an early analysis of sovereign borrowing in private financial markets predating the debt 
the current policy stance is sufficient to prevent a “hard landing.” 
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the relative bargaining power in debt renegotiations, and so forth (see Eaton 
and Fernhdez 1995 for a recent theoretical survey on sovereign debt, and see 
Cline 1995 for a retrospective on the debt crisis). 
In this section we first present a simple illustrative framework that empha- 
sizes the factors that determine international investors' willingness to lend to a 
given country and their interaction with factors affecting the country's willing- 
ness to meet its external obligations. We  turn next to the issue of asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders and its relation to the composition 
of capital flows. 
3.3.1 
Consider a simple (static) model of  international portfolio diversification. 
An  international investor has to decide its  optimal portfolio allocation by 
choosing investment projects across J + 1 countries, indexed by j.  The rate of 
return in the home country (j  = H) expressed in foreign currency follows an 
i.i.d. process with mean p,  and variance u;.  The remaining J countries (the 
rest of  the world) are symmetric and have rates of  return rj, which follow a 
random i.i.d. process with mean p and variance u'. 
and denote 
by 8 the share of the investor's portfolio allocated to the home country. Her or 
his portfolio's expected return is given by 
(5) 
and the variance is given by 
Willingness to Lend: Portfolio Diversification 
Assume that the international investor has a portfolio of  size 
W[0p,  + (1 - 8)p],  pH = i,  - i/s, 
where i,  is the rate of return in the home country's currency,  s is the exchange 
rate between the home country and the rest of the world, and a dot indicates a 
time derivative. The variance of the rate of return, uk, represents the combined 
effect of  exchange rate and domestic interest rate risk. Clearly, both pH and 
a:  are endogenous, since they depend on the government's policy choices, but 
this is not made explicit here. The international investor is assumed to have 
constant absolute risk aversion y; thus expected utility U is given by 
Maximizing expected utility with respect to 8 and denoting the foreign cur- 
rency value of the home country's indebtedness 8W  by B,  we obtain 65  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
Fig. 3.1  Supply of external funds 
Figure 3.1 depicts the supply of  external finance B, as a function of  the 
mean rate of return in the home country pH,  which will be identified as the cost 
of foreign borrowing. From equations (5)  and (8) one can verify that the supply 
schedule is upward sloping; that is, the country has to raise the rate of interest 
(adjusted for expected exchange rate changes) in order to elicit more capital 
from abroad. Furthermore, the supply schedule shifts upward as (i) the oppor- 
tunities for international diversification (J)  rise (as in the case of  “emerging 
markets”), (ii) the country’s credit and exchange rate risk (a;) increases, and 
(iii) the rate of interest in the rest of the world (p) increases. It shifts downward 
as (iv) the riskiness of the rest of the world‘s investment projects (u) rises and 
(v) the size of the world‘s portfolio (W)  increases. 
As highlighted in figure 3.1, at the given level of external liabilities B,,  in 
order to elicit external funding a country must pay the rate of interest pH, which 
is determined as the intersection between the supply-of-external-funds sched- 
ule and the vertical line originating at B,.  If  a negative shock that shifts the 
supply schedule upward occurs, there will be an increase in the country’s cost 
of external borrowing pH. This increase may force the country to change its 
policy stance in order to generate the additional flow of resources necessary to 
service external liabilities.* For  example,  Calvo (1997) shows how  small 
“news” about the mean return of the investment project in the home country 
8. The risk premium is exogenous in this model, and the home country’s share of the world 
portfolio adjusts so as to ensure that eq. (8) holds. A more complete model would endogenize the 
domestic rate of return and its variance, the rate of depreciation, and hence the risk premium. 
Dornbusch (1990) emphasizes the importance of the option value of waiting on the part of interna- 
tional investors (or domestic residents holding funds abroad) in determining the required risk pre- 
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can have a large effect on the share of world portfolio allocated to the home 
country when the portfolio is well diversified (J is large). In a similar setup, 
Calvo and Mendoza (1996b) find that in the presence of costly learning about 
country-specific information, multiple portfolio allocation equilibria charac- 
terized by  investors’ herding behavior can occur. Furthermore, the range of 
possible allocations widens when J increases. 
How would structural and policy factors impinge on the variables that deter- 
mine willingness to lend in the stylized portfolio model presented above? The 
domestic rate of return can be linked with the economy’s productivity growth 
prospects and with fiscal policy (directly in the form of current tax rates and 
indirectly through expected future taxation needed to repay the public debt). It 
will also be affected by the efficiency with which domestic financial markets 
intermediate foreign funds. The variance of domestic returns is linked, for ex- 
ample, to the overall degree of macroeconomic stability and in particular to 
the vulnerability of the domestic economy to shocks such as fluctuations in the 
terms of trade. In that context, the variance is reduced when the diversification 
of the production and export structure increases. 
3.3.2  Asymmetric Information and Composition of External Flows 
In addition to risk aversion considerations, asymmetric information and en- 
forcement problems can also play a pervasive role in international borrowing 
and lending, in particular for countries with less developed capital markets. 
The composition of the supply of external funds can have important implica- 
tions for the intensity of asymmetric information problems in the context of 
international capital flows. Foreign investors can lack the same kind of infor- 
mation with respect to domestic agents and would  thus require a positive 
spread between domestic and international rates of return. Razin, Sadka, and 
Yuen (1998) formalize the idea that these problems can be more severe in the 
case of portfolio debt and equity than in the case of foreign direct investment, 
insofar as the latter is a “tie-in” activity, involving an inflow of both capital and 
managerial inputs. This combination of  inputs can give foreign investors the 
same kind of “home court” advantage (with respect to, say, business informa- 
tion) that domestic investors have, but foreign portfolio (debt and equity) inves- 
tors lack.9 
One general aspect of asymmetric information is that the rate of interest a 
bank charges may itself affect the riskiness of loans by affecting either (i) the 
action of bon-owers (moral hazard or incentive effect) or (ii) their characteris- 
tics (sorting or adverse selection effect). As shown in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
this type of asymmetric information problem can lead to credit rationing (see 
also Folkerts-Landau 1985 for an open economy application). The existence 
of implicit or explicit bailout clauses can worsen moral hazard problems, in an 
9. For empirical studies of the link between foreign direct investment and macroeconomic per- 
formance, see Fry (1993) and Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) among others. 67  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
analogous fashion to a decline in collateral. In practice, the international fi- 
nancial community may be unwilling to let a country default on its debt obliga- 
tions because of  the trade and capital markets disruptions this could induce 
or for protection of foreign investors.1° Moral hazard problems may  also be 
exacerbated by implicit or explicit bailout clauses within a debtor country: for 
example, excessive borrowing by the banking sector can be induced by expec- 
tations of a government bailout should the sector run into financial difficulties. 
In international borrowing and lending, problems of moral hazard can arise 
whenever the borrower can take “hidden actions” that affect output and hence 
its  ability or willingness to meet external obligations. Gertler and Rogoff 
(1990) emphasize this point in a model in which the borrower cannot commit 
to using funds for investment, rather than for “disguised consumption” or capi- 
tal flight. This argument links the intensity of  moral hazard problems-and 
hence the level of  lending-with  the level of  investment or (inversely) with 
capital flight; it also underscores how foreign direct investment may be a way 
for foreign investors to ensure that the final use of their funds is “appropriate.” 
What other macroeconomic and structural features of a borrower can affect 
willingness to pay and willingness to lend? In principle, variables that increase 
the cost of default on foreign obligations (by raising, e.g., the impact on the 
domestic economy of sanctions or isolation from international capital markets) 
strengthen willingness to pay and therefore make a sudden reversal in capital 
flows less likely. If default is associated with trade disruptions, its cost will be 
higher for more open economies. If  the “punishment” for default consists in 
the inability to borrow and lend on international capital markets (at least for 
some time), its cost would be higher for countries with higher output variabil- 
ity, because of the inability to smooth consumption. 
In sum, informational asymmetries, enforcement problems, and other forms 
of capital market imperfections can cause the supply of external funds to be 
less than perfectly elastic, and to be subject to shifts under a number of domes- 
tic and external shocks. Structural factors as well as the macroeconomic policy 
stance determine the vulnerability of the economy to shocks, as the theoretical 
discussion has highlighted. 
3.4  Country Episodes 
We  now turn to a description of the experience of a selected group of  coun- 
tries with persistent current account imbalances. We  attempt to characterize 
these different experiences in terms of  macroeconomic policy stance, struc- 
tural characteristics of  the economy, composition of  external liabilities, and 
balance-of-payments shocks. Figures 3.2 through 3.8 illustrate the behavior of 
the current account balance, the level of  savings and investment, the real ex- 
10. On the effect of this type of moral hazard on the behavior of commercial banks lending to 
developing countries, see, e.g., Dooley (1995). 68  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
change rate, the degree of openness, and the level of external liabilities. We do 
not discuss developments in Chile and Korea during the nineties, because in 
the period under examination (1990-95)  these countries did not experience 
sustained current account imbalances. 
3.4.1 
Chile, 1977-82 
The first half of the seventies was a turbulent period for Chile, both politi- 
cally and economically. The coup in  1973 ousted Allende's socialist govern- 
ment and installed a military regime with radically different economic policies. 
After a period during which the role of government in the economy had stead- 
ily increased, the new regime strived for a balanced budget, privatization, and 
financial and trade liberalization. In the aftermath of  the coup the economy 
endured a severe recession (1974-75),  resulting from a combination of exter- 
nal  shocks (fall in the price of copper and increase in the price of  oil) and 
domestic policy tightening. (See figs. 3.2 and 3.3.) 
By  1978, yearly inflation was reduced from over 400 percent in 1973 to 30 
percent, the public sector budget was in surplus (1.5 percent of GDP), and the 
economy was growing at 8 percent. However, the pickup in investment and the 
low level of private savings implied a large current account deficit (5 percent 
of GDP). Furthermore, the unemployment rate stood above 14 percent. After 
having adopted a schedule of  preannounced devaluations of the nominal ex- 
change rate (the tablita) for a year and a half, the government decided to use 
the exchange rate as a full-fledged nominal anchor in the disinflation process 
and fixed the rate vis-8-vis the dollar in June 1979. The following years were 
characterized by a continuation of strong recovery. Inflation, however, declined 
slowly, with full backward-looking indexation providing inertial momentum 
(Edwards and Cox-Edwards 1987). This inflationary process was sustained by 
monetary growth due to large capital inflows, reflecting private sector external 
borrowing to finance investment in the wake of financial liberalization.  'I  Con- 
sequently, the real exchange rate appreciated rapidly and the current account 
balance deteriorated, with the ratio of the deficit to GDP reaching double digits 
in 1981. 
By late 1981 wholesale prices were falling, but the magnitude of the cumu- 
lative real appreciation caused expectations of  a devaluation and therefore a 
widening of interest rate spreads between peso- and dollar-denominated assets. 
Output began to decline and unemployment increased. In  1982 a sequence of 
external events-a  sharp decline in the terms of  trade, the large increase in 
world interest rates, and a drying up of external sources of financing following 
Latin America and the Early Eighties 
11. As pointed out by  Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1987) among others, private foreign bor- 
rowing did not cany government guarantees. A large fraction of foreign borrowing was carried 
out by the so-called grupos-large  conglomerates that included industrial firms as well as banks. 
They had been major buyers of privatized firms, and their banks extended most of their lending to 
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Fig. 3.2  Current account and real effective exchange rate: Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico, 1970-95 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issues); IMF,  World 
Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C., various years). 
the Mexican debt crisis-forced  the government to abandon its exchange rate 
peg. In June 1982, the exchange rate was devalued by 18 percent and the wage 
indexation scheme was  abandoned. This, however, was  not sufficient. As in 
Mexico in 1994, speculation against the peso increased and reserves declined 
rapidly. Toward the end of  1982, in the shadow of an impending financial crisis 
the government imposed capital controls and import surcharges. By June 1983, 70  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
Fig. 3.3  Saving and investment: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, 1970-95 
Sources: See  fig. 3.2. 
the peso had been devalued in nominal terms by  close to 100 percent with 
respect to its June 1982 level. 
The crisis caused widespread bankruptcies in the private sector, and the gov- 
ernment was forced to liquidate banks but also to bail out several other finan- 
cial and nonfinancial institutions. In particular, the central bank intervened in 
support of the banking system, giving rise to a large quasi-fiscal deficit. The 
absence of government guarantees on private foreign borrowing notwithstand- 71  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
ing, the government assumed responsibility for a large fraction of the private 
sector’s foreign liabilities. The crisis was extremely severe: output fell by  14 
percent in 1983 alone and unemployment rose dramatically to close to 20 per- 
cent (Corbo and Fischer 1994). Inflation rebounded to its “historical” level of 
27 percent, and the management of the crisis caused an initial policy reversal 
with respect to exchange rate policy, wage indexation, current and capital ac- 
count openness, and privatization. Starting in 1984, however, the government 
resumed its policy of trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, and 
the adjustment of the Chilean economy, although painful, was relatively rapid. 
Growth resumed in  1984 and has averaged over 6 percent over the past  10 
years. 
It should be noted that not all indicators pointed to a likely crisis. The econ- 
omy was experiencing fast economic growth. The fiscal balance was in surplus 
throughout this period; indeed, the government had been reducing its external 
liabilities. Investment was growing rapidly, albeit from a low base, and so were 
exports (until 1981). Which factors can then explain the Chilean 1982 crisis? 
Five factors are most commonly mentioned: 
1. Size of external debt. External indebtedness was close to 50 percent of 
GDP in 1981, with interest payments totaling 5.5 percent of GDP. 
2.  Overvalued real exchange rate. Inflation failed to converge rapidly to 
world levels due to the effects of lagged wage indexation, as well as to in- 
creased demand for nontradables fueled by foreign borrowing. Investment was 
stimulated by  the reduced price of imported capital goods, as well as by  the 
possibility of getting financing on world markets at the world rate of interest, 
given the pegged exchange rate. 
3. Low level of savings. National savings averaged only around 10 percent 
of GDP during the period 1978-8 1. Their decline was particularly significant 
in 198  1, possibly reflecting intertemporal substitution effects. 
4.  Weak financial system and overborrowing. “Overborrowing” by the pri- 
vate sector was fueled by  the availability of foreign credit (following the re- 
cycling of oil exporters’ surpluses) and facilitated by weak supervision of the 
banking sector, which encouraged risk-taking behavior (see Diaz-Alejandro 
1985; Velasco 1991). In this context, de la Cuadra and Valdes-Prieto (1992) 
stress the negative role played by  the government’s extension to the private 
sector of exchange rate and interest rate risk guarantees. 
5.  Severe external shocks. The large increase in world interest rates, the 
drying up of foreign financing, and a decline in the terms of trade, the intensity 
of which was compounded by the narrow commodity specialization of exports, 
dominated by copper, all contributed to precipitating the external crisis. 
Colombia I, 1980-88 
Colombia is one of the few Latin American economies that did not experi- 
ence an external debt crisis during the early eighties, notwithstanding severe 
external shocks. The success of Colombia has been attributed to a conservative 72  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
macroeconomic policy stance that avoided large fiscal imbalances and swings 
in the real exchange rate (see, e.g., Ocampo 1989; Cline 1995; Clavijo 1995). 
After a period of rapid economic growth during the second half of the seven- 
ties, characterized by  a “coffee boom,” the economic situation deteriorated in 
the period  1981-84.  Economic growth slowed considerably, the current ac- 
count turned to a large deficit (close to 8 percent of GDP in  1982 and 1983), 
and net capital inflows fell, causing foreign exchange reserve losses. The dete- 
rioration in the current account reflected both weaker export performance be- 
cause of the world recession and fast growth in imports. Fiscal accounts deteri- 
orated, both because of the impact of slower growth on revenues and because 
of  an increase in current expenditure. Investment expenditure was  reduced 
after 1982 because of difficulties in obtaining external financing. During 1981 
and 1982 the real exchange rate appreciated, leading the authorities to increase 
the monthly rate of depreciation. This succeeded in reversing the appreciation. 
Notwithstanding an improvement in the trade balance, the current account was 
negatively affected by higher interest payments and all external debt indica- 
tors worsened. 
A fiscal adjustment plan was adopted at the end of  1984 and resulted in a 
rapid reduction of  the fiscal deficit in the following two years (by around 7 
percentage points). The fiscal adjustment plan was accompanied by  a large 
depreciation in the real effective exchange rate and opened the door to a series 
of large loans from commercial banks, which allowed a refinancing of princi- 
pal coming due without the need for rescheduling. Favorable terms-of-trade 
developments (an increase in the price of coffee), as well as coal and oil dis- 
coveries, led to a current account surplus and an acceleration of  economic 
growth to 5 percent in  1986. The reduction in  current account imbalances, 
reflecting an increase in both public and private sector savings, together with 
the increase in growth, allowed Colombia to reverse the increasing trend of the 
ratio of external debt to GDP. 
Mexico I, 1977-82 
After a short period of  fiscal adjustment following a balance-of-payments 
crisis in 1976, the policy stance was relaxed as a result of the increase in the 
amount of  proven oil reserves from 6.4 billion barrels in  1975 to  16 billion 
barrels in 1977. Constraints on foreign borrowing were lifted as foreign banks 
started to compete to lend to Mexico on very attractive terms. On the domestic 
policy front, public expenditure increased substantially from 29 percent of 
GDP in  1977 to 41 percent in  1981, with state-owned enterprises taking an 
important role in public investment. During 1978-81 public and private invest- 
ment rose rapidly, and growth was above 8 percent. While private savings in- 
creased, public sector savings experienced a significant decline; this, together 
with the investment boom, was reflected in large current account deficits (over 
6 percent of GDP in 1981). As a result, external debt almost doubled in dollar 
terms between 1979 and 1981. 73  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
Although domestic inflation exceeded 20 percent, the nominal exchange rate 
was being devalued at a slower rate, resulting in a large real appreciation. Dur- 
ing  1981 it became clear that the earlier assumptions regarding the rate of 
increase of oil export revenues were unrealistic. This fueled speculation that 
the peso would be devalued, causing massive capital flight. To stem the drain 
of foreign exchange reserves, the government increased its external borrowing 
by over $20 billion; the terms of the debt, however, began to worsen with an 
increase in the spreads over the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR; at a 
time when the LIBOR was increasing) and a shortening of maturity. 
The crisis worsened in 1982, as a result of external shocks (such as the in- 
crease in world real interest rates and the world recession) and increasing fiscal 
imbalances. A 40 percent devaluation of the peso in February stemmed capital 
flight only briefly, and the government had to borrow an additional $5.7 billion 
in medium-term, syndicated loans. In August a dual exchange rate system was 
established. Shortly thereafter, dollar deposits at Mexican commercial banks 
were converted into pesos at an unfavorable exchange rate, and on 1 September 
the banking system was nationalized. During the last four months of the year, 
there was a de facto moratorium on foreign debt service, until a December 
agreement with foreign commercial banks to reschedule $23 billion of  debt 
amortization was reached. In 1983, the new de la Madrid administration imple- 
mented a drastic adjustment plan, characterized by a fiscal contraction, a lifting 
of  previously adopted trade restrictions, and a reduction in real wages. The 
turnaround in the current account was immediate-it  registered a surplus, al- 
though this came at a heavy price. Output contracted by over 5 percent in 1983, 
with public and private investment falling drastically. 
Aside from external shocks and the high level of external indebtedness, what 
were the key aspects of the 1982 Mexican crisis? Four factors are often men- 
tioned in the literature:  ** 
1.  Real exchange rate appreciation. Between 1977 and 1981, Mexico’s ex- 
change rate appreciated by over 30 percent in real terms vis-A-vis the dollar 
(Buffie  1989). This appreciation stimulated a boom  in  imports, which in- 
creased much faster than oil exports. The perceived unsustainability of the ex- 
change rate led to large capital flight during the years preceding the crisis, as 
well as in the following years. 
2.  Large fiscal imbalances. Unlike in Chile, in Mexico most of  the debt 
accumulation reflected public sector external borrowing. The increase in pub- 
lic expenditure during the late seventies and early eighties was extremely large, 
and it came on top of  another large increase in the early seventies. Further- 
12. Some observers (Diaz-Alejandro 1984) attributed the debt crisis mainly to external factors 
and underlined that several distinguished commentators (and the commercial banks themselves) 
argued that there was nothing to worry about because the current account deficits were financing 
higher public and private investment. Indeed, the macroeconomic performance between 1978 and 
1981 was very good, with high growth and rapid increases in public and private investment. 74  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
more, it financed not only increased public investment but also growing public 
consumption. Notwithstanding the large revenue increase coming from oil, to- 
tal revenues failed to keep up with expenditures, causing large fiscal deficits 
to emerge. The government’s external position was worsened by  the fact that 
public sector external borrowing went to finance not only fiscal imbalances but 
also private capital flight, as foreign exchange reserves were rapidly depleted. 
3.  Misperceptions regarding oil wealth. Policy design in Mexico was based 
on an overoptimistic assessment of future oil prices; when the expected price 
increases failed to materialize, the government did not introduce alternative 
measures to limit fiscal imbalances. 
4.  Weakness of the financial system. The Mexican system was characterized 
by financial repression, with high reserve requirements that had the main pur- 
pose of facilitating the financing of public sector deficits. The sharp deteriora- 
tion in macroeconomic conditions in 1982 worsened banks’ and firms’ balance 
sheets, which were further hit by the effects of the exchange rate depreciation 
on their dollar exposure. 
3.4.2  East Asia in the Early Eighties 
Korea, 1978-86 
Korea experienced fast growth rates during the 1960s and the 1970s, driven 
by  investment and  export^.'^ Foreign indebtedness, after rising sharply at the 
time of the first oil crisis, remained stable as a fraction of GDP at around 32 
percent in the latter part of the seventies, notwithstanding persistent current 
account deficits, thanks to the high growth rate and low or negative real interest 
rates. The second oil shock, however, hit the Korean economy at a particularly 
delicate juncture. It was preceded by  a period of real exchange rate apprecia- 
tion, due to high domestic inflation coupled with a fixed nominal exchange rate 
vis-l-vis the U.S. dollar, and coincided with a period of  political instability, 
following the assassination of President Park in October 1979, and with a bad 
harvest. As a result, the economy experienced a deep recession in 1980; the 
current account deficit rose to over 8 percent of  GDP as savings declined 
sharply, and the ratio of foreign debt to GDP increased to 44 percent. (See figs. 
3.4 and 3.5.) 
The policy response to the recession consisted of  a devaluation of  the ex- 
change rate, a tightening of macroeconomic policy, and the adoption of struc- 
tural reforms, such as trade and financial liberalization. Economic growth re- 
sumed in  1981, and the fiscal stance was relaxed. During this adjustment 
period, Korea was able to continue to borrow on international markets and 
finance large current account deficits: the ratio of foreign debt to GDP reached 
52 percent in 1982. With strong growth under way and a recovery in external 
13. For analyses of the Korean experience, see, e.g., Collins and Park (1989), SaKong (1993), 
Soon (1993). and Haggard et al. (1994). 75  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
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Fig. 3.4  Current account and real effective exchange rate: Korea, Malaysia, 
and Thailand, 1970-95 
Sources: See fig. 3.2. 
demand, Korea turned to the objective of reducing the ratio of foreign debt to 
GDP: it tightened monetary and fiscal policy in 1983-84, let the exchange rate 
depreciate in real terms, and accelerated the pace of  structural reform. By 
1984, the objectives of  inflation reduction and fiscal stabilization were met, 
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Fig. 3.5  Saving and investment: Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, 1970-95 
Sources: See fig. 3.2. 
During this period, investment and economic growth remained strong, unlike 
in other highly indebted countries after the debt crisis, and savings increased, 
thanks to a rebound in household saving. 
The second half of the eighties was characterized by more favorable external 
developments, such as the fall in the price of oil and the depreciation of  the 
dollar, and by  a more flexible exchange rate policy, characterized by  a large 77  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
real depreciation until  1986. The current account turned to large surpluses, 
allowing the government to prepay a large portion of  the external debt. By 
1988, the ratio of foreign debt to GDP was only 20 percent. 
What lessons can be drawn from the Korean experience? Notwithstanding 
rapid growth (driven by investment and exports) before the second oil shock, 
the situation in 1979-80 was difficult. The policies pursued in the wake of the 
first oil shock had led to a loosening of monetary policy and to an overvalued 
real exchange rate, and the second oil price shock and a bout of political tur- 
moil posed a threat to macroeconomic stability. However, Korea experienced 
a rapid recovery following the recession of  1980. This was facilitated by the 
continuation of Korea’s access to international capital markets, which allowed 
the country to borrow until growth was solidly under way again; indeed, the 
debt-GDP ratio continued to rise until 1982. With inflation under control and 
a more stable macroeconomic environment, a second stage of the adjustment 
process was undertaken, characterized by monetary and fiscal tightening and a 
gradual real depreciation of the exchange rate. This was very successful: exter- 
nal imbalances were rapidly reduced and economic growth remained strong. 
Malaysia I, 1979-86 
At  the  end  of  the  seventies, Malaysia’s macroeconomic  situation  was 
~tab1e.l~  The country had grown at an average rate of over 6 percent during the 
seventies; it had low inflation, fast export growth, low external debt, and hefty 
current account surpluses. The country had diversified substantially its produc- 
tion and export structure away from primary commodities toward manufac- 
tured goods and textiles. Nevertheless, primary commodities still accounted 
for over 70 percent of Malaysia’s total exports in 1980. 
The oil shock of  1979-80  implied a sharp tems-of-trade  improvement. 
Around the same time, there was a shift in the government’s macroeconomic 
policy stance. Namely, the government pushed forward a heavy industry drive, 
similar to the one pursued by the Korean authorities a few years earlier. This 
drive was pursued through large investment projects undertaken both directly 
and through state-owned enterprises, which led to a rapid increase in the share 
of public investment in GDP and a widening of the federal budget deficit to 
over 17 percent of GDP in 1982. Around 40 percent of the deficit was financed 
through external borrowing. The deterioration in the fiscal accounts was mir- 
rored in external developments: the deficit on the current account reached 13 
percent of  GDP in  1982, resulting in a sharp increase in external debt. This 
deficit also reflected unfavorable external conditions-the  slowdown in the 
world economy, the increase in world real interest rates, and a progressive dete- 
rioration in the terms of trade, as well as a real exchange rate appreciation. 
Womes about the rapid rise in domestic and external imbalances prompted 
14. See, e.g., Demery and Demery (1992) for an account of the Malaysian experience during 
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the Malaysian government to undertake a fiscal consolidation program, charac- 
terized by  a curtailment of public sector investment-"development  expendi- 
ture" was reduced in nominal terms by 30 percent in the period 1983-84. The 
federal deficit was reduced to 7 percent of GDP and the current account deficit 
to 6 percent of GDP by  1984. The macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustment 
were in part cushioned by a temporary reversal in the terms-of-trade deteriora- 
tion in  1984, a recovery in world demand, and a sustained expansion in the 
manufacturing and construction sectors; as a result, the economy continued to 
grow at a rapid pace. 
However, economic activity experienced a sharp downturn  in  1985 and 
1986, reflecting a marked deterioration of  external conditions (a substantial 
worsening in the terms of trade and weak external demand), further fiscal tight- 
ening, and a drastic slowdown in construction activity. Public investment was 
scaled back further; at the same time, monetary policy was loosened, interest 
rates were allowed to decline, and the exchange rate depreciated substantially. 
The slowdown was accompanied by  severe problems in the financial system, 
triggered by the collapse in the real estate market. The combined effect of the 
large real exchange rate depreciation and of fiscal contraction led to a reduction 
in absorption and expenditure switching; imports declined substantially and 
export growth picked up. Although weak economic activity limited the size of 
the deficit adjustment, a sharp fall in private consumption and private invest- 
ment implied a virtual balancing of  the current account in  1986. Starting in 
1987, economic activity recovered, and for the rest of  the decade the current 
account balance recorded large surpluses, reflecting a large increase in the sav- 
ings rate. This allowed Malaysia to substantially reduce its external debt. 
What are the salient features of the Malaysian experience? The rapid buildup 
in domestic and external debt of  the early eighties required a drastic policy 
shift to ensure fiscal and external sustainability. This shift involved not only 
fiscal consolidation but also structural measures to encourage private sector 
investment. The prolonged period of fiscal adjustment took its toll on economic 
activity in 1985-86,  as domestic and external conditions deteriorated. Never- 
theless, the downturn was  reversed rkpidly, as the sharp real exchange rate 
depreciation and the more favorable environment for private sector investment 
allowed for a resumption in growth, driven by exports and private investment. 
Thailand I, 1979-90 
After a period of rapid growth and persistent current account deficits in the 
late seventies, the second oil shock hit the economy at the same time as a 
decline in services receipts due to the closure of American bases. As had been 
the case after the first oil shock, savings declined and the current account defi- 
cit widened to over 7 percent of GDP in 1979. The following period was char- 
acterized by  repeated standby arrangements with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and Structural Adjustment Loans from the World Bank; while 
progress was made in the area of structural reform and in reducing the inflation 79  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
rate, external imbalances and budget deficits persisted in the following years, 
in part because of  unfavorable external developments (the worldwide reces- 
sion, the increase in real interest rates, and a further decline in the terms of 
trade), as well as because of a consistent  pattern of revenue overestimation (see 
Robinson, Byeon, and Teja 1991).  As a result, the ratio of external debt to GDP 
continued to increa~e.'~  The exchange rate was devalued by  9 percent at the 
end of 1981 but continued to appreciate in real effective terms thereafter, being 
pegged to the dollar in a period of dollar appreciation. The slowdown in eco- 
nomic activity exacerbated weaknesses in  the financial system, and a crisis 
occurred in  1983, when the authorities had to intervene in several finance and 
security companies, as well as five commercial banks (Johnston 1991). 
A policy shift occurred at the end of 1984. It consisted of a 15 percent nomi- 
nal exchange rate depreciation,  accompanied by a drastic tightening in the fis- 
cal policy stance. This time the baht depreciated significantly in real effective 
terms, as domestic inflation did not erode the competitiveness gains and the 
dollar (which the baht continued to shadow) started to depreciate. The com- 
bined effect of the fiscal adjustment, real depreciation, and the more favorable 
external environment were impressive: the current account deficit was elimi- 
nated in 1986, as manufacturing exports increased rapidly, the budget was bal- 
anced in 1987, and the ratio of external debt to GDP, after peaking in 1985 at 
45 percent, began to decline. Growth accelerated to over 11 percent in 1987- 
90, driven by exports and by a boom in private investment, while fiscal policy 
generated increasing budget surpluses. Export growth resulted in an increase 
in the share of exports in GDP to 35 percent by  1989 (against 22 percent in 
1985); the share of  private investment in GDP more than doubled between 
1986 and 1990, with the investment boom sustained by inflows of foreign di- 
rect investment from Japan and other Asian newly industrialized economies. 
The increase in private investment more than compensated for the decline in 
public investment caused by the fiscal retrenchment, and the large increase in 
public savings was not accompanied by a decline in private savings. As a result, 
during this period both investment and savings continued to rise as a fraction 
of GDP. 
3.4.3  Latin America in the First Half of the Nineties 
Colombia II, 1992-95 
At the beginning of the decade, Colombia was characterized by  a depreci- 
ated level of the real exchange rate, which reflected in part unfavorable terms- 
of-trade developments in the period 1987-89.  Tight fiscal policy and the com- 
petitiveness of the exchange rate resulted in a small current account surplus. 
The Colombian economy experienced a surge in capital inflows starting in 
15. State-owned enterprises accounted for around 70 percent of  total public investment and 
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1991. These inflows were initially attracted by  high domestic interest rates, 
reflecting the monetary authorities’ tight policy stance, by the trade and finan- 
cial liberalization undertaken in 1990, and by a tax amnesty to holders of do- 
mestic assets abroad granted at the end of  1990. The inflows were initially met 
with an aggressive sterilization policy on the part of  the central bank, both 
directly through open market operations and indirectly through increases in 
reserve requirements. Capital controls, taxes on capital inflows, and a liberal- 
ization of capital outflows were also used to reduce net inflows (see Schadler 
et al. 1993). By the end of the year, the exchange rate had appreciated by  11 
percent in real effective terms and foreign exchange reserves had risen consid- 
erably, reflecting also a large current account surplus.I6 However, quasi-fiscal 
losses were substantial (0.8 percent of  GDP in  1991), because of the large 
interest differentials between domestic and foreign assets. 
The sterilization policy was significantly modified in  1992; money growth 
accelerated and interest rates were substantially reduced. At the same time, the 
crawling peg exchange rate regime was replaced with a managed float within 
a band vis-8-vis the dollar; an immediate consequence of the increase in ex- 
change rate flexibility was a real appreciation (see Carrasquilla 1995 for a dis- 
cussion). After  a  slowdown in  1991, economic activity recovered  and  the 
growth rate averaged 5 percent a year over the next four years, stimulated by 
new oil discoveries and higher coffee prices in 1994. During this period exter- 
nal accounts worsened, as imports of consumption and capital goods grew rap- 
idly, responding to the trade liberalization and the real appreciation of the peso, 
while private transfer receipts fell. Nontraditional exports grew rapidly as well. 
Capital inflows continued throughout the period, mostly in the form of foreign 
direct investment and long-term borrowing, and foreign exchange reserves 
continued to increase. To stem the inflows the Colombian authorities imposed 
restrictions on foreign borrowing during 1993 and 1994. The current account 
deficit widened in 1995 as public finances worsened, but capital inflows have 
continued, albeit at a slower pace than in  1994, with no significant effect of 
the Mexican crisis. 
Mexico II, 1990-95 
The Mexican  economy experienced large structural changes in  the  late 
eighties and early nineties: a change in monetary and fiscal policy stance was 
followed by restructuring of the external debt, privatization of  public enter- 
prises and of  nationalized banks, and trade liberalization. In the aftermath of 
the debt-restructuring agreement, Mexico regained access to international cap- 
ital markets: net capital inflows increased dramatically in the period 1990-93, 
16. For Colombia part of  the surge in capital inflows was effectively recorded in the current 
account as increased transfers; therefore, the capital account balance understates the amount of in- 
flows. 81  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
totaling over $90 billion (an average of 6 percent of GDP per year), or roughly 
one-fifth of  all net inflows to developing countries. Net foreign direct invest- 
ment during this period was about $17 billion, while inflows of over $60 billion 
occurred in the form of portfolio investment (IMF 1995a). 
Notwithstanding a large increase in government savings, national savings 
fell sharply, and the current account deficit reached almost 7 percent of GDP 
in 1992. The capital account surplus, however, was more than sufficient to fi- 
nance the deficit and allow for rapid reserve accumulation. After a slowdown in 
1993, with output growth falling below 1 percent, the economy recovered the 
following year, with output growing at 3.5 percent, sustained by rapid export 
growth (over 14 percent in dollar terms). Imports, however, continued to grow 
even more rapidly, and the current account deficit widened to 8 percent of GDP. 
Financial market developments in 1994, however, turned unfavorable. A se- 
ries of domestic and external shocks (the peasant revolt in Chiapas in January, 
the assassination of presidential candidate Colosio in March, and the increase 
in U.S. interest rates in the early part of the year) as well as a change in the 
policy stance in the run-up to the August 1994 presidential election caused loss 
of confidence in international financial markets and a reversal in capital flows. 
The real exchange rate was allowed to depreciate within its band, and the cen- 
tral bank sterilized the impact of the loss of reserves on money supply. Subse- 
quently, reserves remained fairly stable until October, as capital inflows re- 
sumed somewhat during the third quarter. Between March and October, the 
authorities reacted to an increase in the interest differential between peso- and 
dollar-denominated short-term public  debt  (Cetes  and  Tesobonos, respec- 
tively) by increasing the share of dollar-denominated Tesobonos in total gov- 
ernment debt outstanding from 6 percent at the end of February to 50 percent 
at the end of November. 
The crisis unfolded very quickly. At the end of November tensions resur- 
faced on foreign exchange markets, and the Bank of  Mexico lost reserves 
again. The fluctuation band of the peso was widened by 15 percent on 19 De- 
cember in an attempt to stem foreign exchange pressures. This was, however, 
insufficient. The peso reached the new edge of the bank within two days, and 
reserves were drained trying to maintain the exchange rate at the band's edge. 
On 22 December it was  announced that the peso would be allowed to float 
against the U.S. dollar. The Mexican currency plummeted, as doubts surfaced 
about the ability of Mexico to service its short-term liabilities. Notwithstand- 
ing an international rescue package put together at the end of January, 1995 
was a very difficult year for the Mexican economy, with widespread bankrupt- 
cies, generalized financial distress, and a sharp decline in economic activity. 
There are several, to some degree complementary, explanations of the Mexi- 
can crisis (see IMF 1995b for an early assessment). Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and 
Valdes (1995) argue that the use of the peso as a nominal anchor in the disin- 
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large current account deficits, which were ultimately unsustainable. According 
to this view, an exchange rate correction was overdue (see Dornbusch and Wer- 
ner  1994 for a precrisis analysis along these lines). The domestic political 
shocks and the external shocks simply exposed the vulnerability of the Mexi- 
can economy.L7 
An alternative, but possibly complementary view, stresses policy inconsis- 
tencies that emerged in 1994: in particular, the monetary policy stance and the 
management of the public debt, as well as a shift in investors’ sentiment. Once 
capital inflows stopped in the second quarter of  1994 because of the increase 
in U.S. interest rates and political events in Mexico, reserves started to drop 
because of the current account deficit. The sterilization of reserve losses by the 
Bank of Mexico, however, prevented interest rates from exerting an impact on 
the direction of capital flows and, through a dampening of economic activity, 
on the current account balance.I8 Furthermore, the large conversion of  short- 
term peso-denominated public debt into short-term dollar-denominated public 
debt implied an increasing stock of short-term liabilities denominated in for- 
eign exchange that could be “redeemed” at the central bank in exchange for re- 
serves (see, e.g., Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996;  Calvo and Mendoza 1996a). 
How does the Mexican experience relate to the sustainability indicators dis- 
cussed in the theoretical section? The ratios of foreign debt to GDP and of debt 
to exports (34.7 and 184 percent, respectively) were not excessively high by 
historical  standards  and  also  in  comparison  with  other  heavily  indebted 
middle-income developing countries. Fiscal policy, a clear culprit in the previ- 
ous two Mexican crises, had been restrained for the past four years. Exports, 
although still low as a fraction of GDP,I9 were going strong in 1994. On the 
other side, the banking system was weak, with a large fraction of bad loans 
and a mismatch between the maturity structures of  assets and liabilities; the 
national savings rate had declined to very low levels; and the real exchange 
rate was overvalued, at least to some degree (although there is disagreement 
on what would have been the appropriate way to “unwind” the overvaluation). 
Finally, the impending election made it more difficult to undertake policy ad- 
17. Dombusch et d.  (1995) recognize that the current account deficit and the real exchange rate 
appreciation were, to some degree, the logical consequence of the productivity increases facilitated 
by the implementation of large market-oriented reforms, the  access to the North American Free 
Trade Area, the reduction of inflation, and the size of the public sector. In this context, the increase 
in permanent income would lead private agents to raise their consumption level, while the increase 
in output would take some more time to surface because of the lags associated with investment 
and the intersectoral reallocation of resources induced by trade liberalization and changes in rela- 
tive prices. The issue is to what degree the real appreciation reflected a misalignment. 
18. The reluctance of  the monetary authorities to raise domestic interest rates was allegedly 
driven by the fragile situation of the banking system. However, a drastic increase in interest rates 
was later forced on the authorities by the currency crisis. 
19. The ratio of exports to GDP in Mexico differs depending on whether it is calculated using 
national income accounts or balance-of-payments statistics (as reported in the IMF‘s Infernational 
Financial Statistics).  Using the former, the ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP was 12.4 
percent in 1993. Using the latter, it was 17 percent. The number reported in table 3.2 corresponds 
to the balance-of-payments definition. 83  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
justments in response to the series of domestic and external shocks that hit the 
economy during 1994. 
3.4.4  East Asia in the First Half of the Nineties 
Malaysia 11,  1991-95 
The second episode of large current account deficits in the nineties is charac- 
terized by  a different macroeconomic environment than in the early eighties, 
with high growth driven by booming private investment and exports (helped 
by fast growth among East Asian trading partners) and large surpluses in the 
capital account. The share of investment in GDP reached 38 percent in 1994, 
with private investment accounting for two-thirds of the total. A rising fraction 
of this investment reflected inflows in the form of foreign direct investment, in 
particular from Japan and Asian newly industrialized countries. Exports (82 
percent of GDP by  1994) grew rapidly, in particular exports of manufactures, 
accounting for close to 80 percent of  total exports. The private investment 
boom encouraged fast import growth, in particular of intermediate and capital 
goods, causing a narrowing of the trade surplus. The economic policy stance 
was different from the one adopted during the early eighties: fiscal policy was 
much more restrained, with the ratio of public debt to GDP steadily declining, 
and monetary policy aimed at maintaining control over monetary aggregates 
in the face of substantial capital inflows while resisting a sharp appreciation of 
the exchange rate. 
Large capital inflows began in 1990 and increased significantly in the fol- 
lowing years-in  1993 alone the capital account surplus was over 20 percent 
of  GDP. Long-term flows remained relatively stable during 1992-94,  but the 
importance of short-term capital inflows (mainly changes in the net foreign as- 
set position of financial institutions, as well as portfolio investment) increased 
significantly in 1992 and 1993. The monetary authorities reacted by trying to 
sterilize the inflows; as a result, between 1991 and 1993 their total accumula- 
tion of  foreign exchange reserves was $17 billion, or 16 percent of GDP per 
annum. The size of the capital inflows, and in particular the large short-term 
component, prompted the authorities to adopt a series of  measures in early 
1994 directed at discouraging short-term flows. As a result, there was a large 
outflow of  short-term capital in 1994, but long-term flows, including foreign 
direct investment, were basically unaffected. The real effective exchange rate 
depreciated slightly, after having appreciated during the period  1991-93.  In 
1995 a continuation of fast growth and booming investment widened current 
account imbalances further, to over 8 percent of GDP. 
Notwithstanding its large and protracted current account deficits, Malaysia 
has avoided a rapid accumulation of external debt, thanks to large non-debt- 
creating inflows; the debt burden measured by interest payments as a fraction 
of GDP, has steadily declined. Relatively to the previous episode, there are no 
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real exchange rate is more competitive, and the more diversified export struc- 
ture reduces the vulnerability to shifts in commodity prices. As to the end of 
1995, the risks seemed to be on the side of  “overheating,” with bottlenecks 
developing in labor markets. 
Thailand II, 1990-95 
During the early nineties, the Thai economy continued to grow at a rate 
close to 9 percent, driven by rapid export growth and growth of domestic de- 
mand. Imports grew even faster than exports, and as a result the trade balance 
worsened and the current account deficit widened to an average of  close to 7 
percent of  GDP during  1990-95.  Thanks to a continuation of  large capital 
inflows, however, the balance of payments remained in surplus (an average of 
close to 4 percent of GDP in 1990-95) and reserves accumulated. 
The response to capital inflows changed during the period. At the beginning 
of  the inflow episode (1988) the authorities relied on a tightening of  fiscal 
policy and on sterilization operations. Furthermore, reserve requirements were 
extended to nonresident deposits. Toward the end of  1990 trade liberalization 
measures were undertaken, and in early 1991 restrictions on capital outflows 
were eased. During this period the process of  financial liberalization contin- 
ued. The monetary policy stance was relaxed by  1993, and interest rates were 
lowered. The composition of inflows changed as well: during 1994 there was 
an increase in short-term inflows, in particular to the banking sector.20  During 
this period, the authorities took steps to enhance prudential supervision of 
banks and other financial institutions (Khan and Reinhart 1995; Koenig 1996). 
After a drastic fiscal contraction in the second half of  the eighties, which 
led to a budget surplus of  over 5 percent of GDP, fiscal policy turned more 
expansionary during the nineties, in order to meet infrastructural bottlenecks, 
but the overall budget balance remained in surplus. At the beginning of  1995, 
the fallout from the Mexican crisis briefly affected capital markets in Thailand; 
equity prices slumped in January, and there was a surge in capital outflows. 
The episode, however, was short-lived. 
At the end of  1995, the fundamentals of the Thai economy appeared mostly 
robust: economic growth was still rapid; the large current account deficits re- 
flected high levels of investment; exports, a large fraction of GDP, were grow- 
ing rapidly; foreign exchange reserves were high; and the exchange rate was 
not appreciated relative to its historical average. Given the persistently large 
current account deficits, sources of concern were the level of external indebted- 
ness, the large share of short-term debt, and the weakness of the banking sys- 
tem, which made the Thai economy vulnerable to shifts in foreign investors’ 
sentiment. More recently, Thailand has been mired in a banking crisis, originat- 
20. There are, however, classification problems for capital inflows in Thailand. As a conse- 
quence of the establishment of an offshore banking center in 1994, an important fraction of foreign 
direct investment flows are now channeled through the domestic banking system and are therefore 
registered as short-term flows. See Koenig (1996). 85  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
ing mainly from a fall in real estate prices, and export growth has slowed down. 
As a result, the baht has repeatedly come under pressure. 
3.5  A Comparative Analysis 
Before discussing in more detail different indicators identified in the theoret- 
ical analysis, it is useful to briefly highlight some common features of the dif- 
ferent country experiences, starting with the eighties. First, all the countries in 
our sample experienced a substantial worsening in external conditions during 
this period, with large terms-of-trade shocks, a substantial increase in world 
interest rates, and the demand effects of the world recession of 1981-82.  Sec- 
ond, each country in  our sample experienced a sustained real exchange rate 
appreciation during the period of high current account imbalances (a partial 
exception being Korea). As a result, the exchange rate at the time of the crisis 
or policy shift was  appreciated with respect to historical averages. Third, in 
Malaysia, Thailand, Colombia, and Mexico persistent current account deficits 
during the late seventies or early eighties were associated with large fiscal im- 
balances. Therefore, the policy adjustment (preemptive or forced by an exter- 
nal crisis) involved both a fiscal and an external dimension and took the form 
of a large fiscal consolidation together with a nominal depreciation of the ex- 
change rate. The latter resulted in a substantial real depreciation that, together 
with an output slowdown at the beginning of the adjustment period, temporar- 
ily raised the ratio of  external debt to GDP. However, in the countries that 
avoided a crisis the real depreciation also spurred export growth and therefore 
reduced current account imbalances; as a result, the ratio of  external debt to 
GDP after the initial increase started to decline. 
The experience with protracted current account deficits during the  1990s 
has different characteristics, both on the external side and on the macroeco- 
nomic policy side. With regard to external conditions, short-term interest rates 
were low and economic activity in industrial countries weak. These conditions, 
together with the change in domestic conditions in a number of  developing 
countries that implemented market-oriented reforms and undertook macroeco- 
nomic stabilization policies, played an important role in the new wave of capi- 
tal inflows from industrial to developing countries, a significant fraction of 
which took the form of portfolio and foreign direct investment.21  Also, the vola- 
tility of terms of trade has been less severe than in the eighties. Macroeconomic 
conditions were in general more stable; none of the countries we consider ex- 
perienced sustained fiscal imbalances, and current account imbalances mainly 
21. Calvo et al. (1993) find that external factors account for a significant fraction of the variance 
in real exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves in a sample of Latin American countries; 
Chuhan et al. (1993) find that external variables “explain” around half of bond and equity flows 
from the United States to Latin American countries; Fernandez-Arias (1996) finds that the decline 
in world interest rates in the early 1990s improved the creditworthiness of debtor countries and 
that “push  factors were dominant in the renewal of capital flows. 86  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
reflected a gap between private savings and private investment. Only Mexico, 
which used the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in a disinflation process, 
experienced a sustained real exchange rate appreciation comparable to those 
of the previous decade. 
A number of features distinguish the Latin American and East Asian coun- 
tries in our sample. During both the eighties and the nineties the East Asian 
countries had higher levels of  savings, investment, and growth and a higher 
degree of trade openness (as measured by the ratio of exports of  goods and 
services to GDP). Since there was no significant difference in debt levels as a 
fraction of GDP during the eighties, this implied that the ratio of debt to ex- 
ports was considerably lower in East Asian countries. Openness increased for 
every country we consider between the 1980s and the 1990s; the East Asian 
countries and Chile stand out for their large increase of national savings and 
domestic investment between the two decades. 
We  turn now  to a more detailed examination of  factors related to current 
account sustainability, based on the theoretical analysis of sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
Clearly, the evaluation of indicators for the 1990s may be subject to a “peso 
problem”; that is, an indicator may be considered poor simply because it sig- 
nals a crisis that has not yet occurred but may do so in the near future. 
Table 3.1 shows the behavior of the average real interest rate on external 
debt.22  It highlights the very large increases in the period 1979-82.  The overall 
impact of  these interest rate increases was compounded by the dynamics of 
tradable goods prices, measured in dollar terms: these implied very large in- 
creases in real interest rates, in particular for Mexico, Chile, Korea, and Thai- 
land in 1982. The overall impact of the real interest rate increase depends on 
the debt-GDP ratio: among the countries in our sample, Chile, Korea, and Ma- 
laysia had a higher ratio of external debt to GDP than Colombia, Thailand, and 
Mexico around the time of the debt crisis (see table 3.3). In the mideighties- 
at the time Colombia, Malaysia, and Thailand implemented policy shifts- 
external conditions (in terms of interest rates) were more favorable. 
Table 3.2 presents the evolution of the terms of trade. All countries experi- 
enced large shocks during the late seventies and the eighties, but with different 
timing. Mexico had  a  dramatic terms-of-trade improvement in  the  period 
1979-8 1, reflecting the oil price boom, but a large subsequent deterioration, 
which brought its terms of trade back to their level of the late seventies. Korea 
was hit heavily by the oil shock, with a large terms-of-trade deterioration in 
1980. Chile’s terms of trade worsened considerably from 1980 onward, while 
Malaysia’s adjustment period in 1985-86  also coincided with a large negative 
terms-of-trade shock. Thailand had a significant terms-of-trade deterioration 
between 1978 and 1982, while Colombia experienced large swings. Overall, 
terms-of-trade volatility was higher in the three Latin American countries dur- 
22. The real interest rate is defined as the average nominal interest rate on external debt, in 
dollar terms, deflated by a three-year moving average index of domestic tradables prices measured 
in dollars. Domestic tradables prices are proxied by  a weighted average of the country’s export 
unit values and industrial countries’ export prices. The methodology draws from Sachs (1985). 87  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
Table 3.1  Real Interest Rates on External Debt 
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Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables (Washington, D.C., various years); IMF, World Economic 
Outlook (Washington, D.C., various years). 
Note: Table reports average dollar nominal interest rate on external debt deflated by  a three-year 
moving average of domestic tradables price inflation. Tradables price inflation is the average of 
changes in domestic export unit values and of industrial countries’ export prices. 
ing the eighties; however, the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on the domestic 
economy is also a function of the degree of openness, which was much larger 
in the East Asian countries. During the nineties, the variability of terms of trade 
has been much more modest, in part because of increased export diversification 
toward manufactured goods. 
A number of macroeconomic and structural indicators for the various coun- 
try episodes are summarized in table 3.3, while table 3.4 presents external fi- 
nancial indicators. The first set of indicators of external sustainability relate to 
the level and interest burden of external debt in relation to GDP. Table 3.3 pre- 
sents a gross measure of  external indebtedness, and table 3.4 a net measure 
that subtracts foreign exchange reserves. Overall, ratios of debt to GDP tended 
to be higher in the eighties than in the nineties, reflecting among other things 
the increased importance of non-debt-creating capital flows in recent years (see 
discussion below). In our limited sample, this ratio does not allow us to clearly 
discriminate between crisis and noncrisis episodes-ratios  of external debt to 
GDP were much higher in Korea and Malaysia I than in Mexico I and II.23  The 
interest burden of external debt “singles out” the experiences of the eighties, 
23. Among the countries in our sample affected by  the Asian crisis, Malaysia stands out as 
having a low ratio of  net external debt to GDP. 88  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
Table 3.2  Terms of Trade (period average = 100) 















































































95.8  108.3 
101.7  105.3 
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95.6  101.1 
85.2  93.4 
80.7  86.3 
93.4  98.2 
110.9  103.4 
107.4  106.9 
104.8  104.6 
153.8  92.9 
166.5  91.9 
107.0  97.7 
102.8  93.6 
100.0  95.1 
94.0  91.5 
70.6  97.0 
94.9  100.1 
85.8  101.1 
86.7  105.5 
95.8  104.0 
91.1  103.6 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C., various years). 
and in particular Chile and Korea, while for the experiences of  the nineties, 
the interest burden is quite similar across countries. The “operational solvency 
condition” (eq. [4]), augmented so as to include the effects of real exchange 
rate changes, implies that the perpetual resource transfer needed to keep the 
ratio of  external debt to GDP from increasing is determined by  the interest 
burden adjusted for growth and real exchange rate appreciation or deprecia- 
tion. In Chile and Mexico I all three components that had been favorable during 
the late 1970s turned unfavorable in the run-up to the crisis: interest rates in- 
creased, high growth came to a halt, and the real exchange rate started to depre- 
ciate. In Colombia, Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia the adjustment period also 
involved a large up-front depreciation; however, the growth slowdown was 
short-lived. In the case of  Mexico 11,  the crisis was preceded by  a relatively 
modest increase in interest burden but followed by  a large real depreciation 
and a deep recession. Based on our sample, it appears therefore that the re- 
source transfer, while clearly a measure of  the cost of  external adjustment, 
is not an unambiguous predictor ex ante. Overall, the interest burden and the Table 3.3  Macroeconomic Indicators 
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34.5  29.5 
(33.9)  (59.5) 
38.0  26.0 
(32.6)  (42.3) 
21.8  32.0 
15.4  6.4 
(9.5)  (11.0) 
(21.8)  (5.2) 
15.5  35.4 
(59.5) 
23.0  41.5 
(62.9) 
25.4  28.1 
39.5  4.6 
(22.5) 
(10.3) 
2.0  1.8 
(2.8) 
0.6  4.9 
(-4.3) 
44.5  42.1 
(12.8)  (53.8) 
33.9  31.3 
(0.5)  (43.5) 
33.2  13.5 
(30.0)  (13.2) 
7.9  23.7 
(34.9)  (31.7) 
29.5  11.1  28.6 
(23.6) 
39.2  33.3  43.7 
(3  1.9) 
23.7  21.2  49.5 
(22.1) 
17.9  71.9  43.7 
(32.8) 
0.7  7.5  1.5 
(0.8) 
0.3  2.2  1.4 
(0.9) 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issues); IME World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C., various years); World Bank,  World 
Debt Tables (Washington, D.C., various years). 
"Net external debt and cumulative current account deficits are ratios to GDP for last year of the period. 
bExternal debt minus nongold foreign exchange reserves. 
'Initial net external debt plus cumulative value of current account deficits, as a ratio to last period's  GDP. 
dShort-term debt and foreign exchange reserves are ratios to total debt for last year of the period. 
'Net  FDI flows and net portfolio flows are average ratios to GDP during the period. 91  Current Account Deficits and Capital Flows 
level of external debt appear to be better indicators of sustainability when ex- 
pressed as ratios to exports, rather than to GDP. 
A second set of indicators comprises the real exchange rate and exports (see 
figs. 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6). A persistent real exchange rate appreciation can be 
driven by “fundamental” factors, such as high productivity growth in the traded 
goods sector, or favorable terms-of-trade shocks. However, in the context of a 
fixed or managed exchange rate system, it could also reflect a fundamental in- 
consistency between the monetary policy stance and exchange rate policy or 
the effects of  inflation inertia or imperfect credibility in the context of  an 
exchange-rate-based inflation stabilization plan (see Calvo 1986). An  “over- 
valuation” would encourage a decline in savings as domestic residents inter- 
temporally substitute present for future consumption, thus contributing to a 
widening of current account imbalances and loss of foreign exchange reserves, 
reinforced by expectations of a future devaluation. 
It is difficult to make the definition of real exchange rate overvaluation oper- 
ational in the absence of a well-established theoretical framework explaining 
real exchange rate behavior (see Edwards 1989). In developing countries that 
have undertaken structural reforms, large capital inflows and a real exchange 
rate appreciation may reflect an increase in productivity and in the return to 
capital; if current account deficits also emerge because of  the underlying in- 
crease in permanent income, they would not be an indicator of unsustainability. 
The difficulty lies in evaluating to what degree a real appreciation reflects im- 
proved fundamentals. 
Table 3.3 also reports the level of the real effective exchange rate (measured 
in terms of relative consumer price indexes) relative to historical averages. The 
three crisis episodes we consider-Mexico  I and I1 and Chile-are  all charac- 
terized by a sustained real exchange rate appreciation in the period preceding 
the crisis, leading to an appreciated level of  the real exchange rate. Colombia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand also experienced a sustained real appreciation during 
the late seventies and early eighties, and an exchange rate devaluation was a 
key component of their adjustment process. In the crisis episodes, an exchange 
rate depreciation was indeed undertaken before the full onset of the crisis but 
failed to prevent it. Our sample evidence thus suggests that large current ac- 
count imbalances are more likely to result in a crisis when they are accompa- 
nied by a relatively appreciated level of the exchange rate.” 
In order to service and reduce external indebtedness, a country needs to rely 
on traded goods production as a source of foreign exchange. Clearly, countries 
with large export sectors can service external debts more easily, because debt 
service will absorb a lower fraction of their total export proceeds. In order to 
generate the foreign exchange necessary to service external debt in case of 
24. The real effective exchange rate appreciated in Thailand and Malaysia between the end of 
our sample period (1995) and the onset of the Asian crisis, following the appreciation of the U.S. 
dollar, to which these currencies were de facto pegged. The magnitude of the appreciation (around 
10 percent) was, however, modest and the real exchange rate was still depreciated relative to histor- 
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Fig. 3.6  Degree of openness, 1970-95 
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an interruption in capital flows, a country needs to engineer a resource shift 
toward the export sector. Since this shift cannot occur instantly, sharp import 
compression may become necessary, with adverse consequences on domestic 
industries relying on imported inputs (Sachs 1985; Sachs and Warner 1995). 
This import compression may be more costly in a relatively closed economy, 
because it is more likely to entail cuts of "essential" imported inputs (William- 
son 1985). The size of the export sector can also be related to willingness-to- 
lend and willingness-to-pay considerations. Insofar as debt default is associ- 
ated with trade disruptions (such as difficulties in obtaining export credits) it 
may  be  more  costly for  an  open  economy. Furthermore, the constituency 
against actions that would entail trade disruptions is also likely to be stronger, 
the larger the size of the export sector. According to the theory of international 
borrowing sketched in section 3.3, higher costs of  default would reduce the 
likelihood of sudden reversals of capital inflows, because foreign investors will 
perceive the country-ceteris  paribus-as  less risky. 
On the other side, a more open economy is, ceteris paribus, more vulnerable 
to external shocks such as fluctuations in the terms of trade or foreign demand 
shocks. In this regard, vulnerability is reduced by a well-diversified commodity 
composition of trade. Fluctuations in commodity prices have a larger impact 
on the terms of trade for countries with narrow export bases, and those particu- 
larly dependent on raw materials for their imports, thus weakening their ability 
to sustain current account  In addition, open economies with strong 
trade ties within a region may be more vulnerable to common regional shocks 
and contagion effects through the effects of  exchange rate devaluation  in 
neighboring countries on competitiveness. 
Among the countries in our sample, the East Asian ones that successfully 
adjusted after experiencing large current account imbalances during the eight- 
ies (Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) had large export shares and managed to 
increase exports significantly during the adjustment period. By contrast, the 
export-GDP ratio was lower in Mexico (especially in 1982) and in Chile, al- 
though it should be pointed out that exports were rising rapidly prior to all 
three crisis episodes considered (Mexico I  and I1 and Chile). In Colombia, 
which had a low export share in the early eighties, both the export share and 
the degree of export diversification increased substantially. These findings are 
in line with results presented by Sachs (1985), who compared East Asian and 
Latin American countries at the time of the debt crisis. The episodes we consid- 
ered thus suggest that large current account imbalances are less likely to lead 
to external crises when the economy has a large export base.26 
25. Ghosh and Ostry (1994) found support for the view that large current account deficits are 
more likely to be unsustainable in countries with less diversified export bases in the context of a 
model based on precautionary savings. Mendoza (1997) presents evidence that the volatility of 
terms of trade is associated with lower economic growth in a wide sample of countries. 
26. Export growth declined significantly in East Asian countries in 1996, after the end of our 
sample period. E.g., export growth in US.  dollars turned slightly negative in Thailand in 1996, 
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A third set of factors comprises national savings and investment (figs. 3.3 
and 3.5). For a given current account balance, the levels of savings and invest- 
ment can have implications for the sustainability of  the external position. To 
the extent that investment is allocated efficiently to high-return activities, high 
levels of  investment imply-ceteris  paribus-higher  future growth through 
the buildup of a larger productive capacity and therefore enhance intertemporal 
solvency (see eq. [3]). High savings and investment ratios can also act as a 
signal of creditworthiness to international investors, because they act as a form 
of commitment to higher future output and thus raise the perceived ability to 
service and reduce external debt. However, investment projects may be chosen 
inefficiently, because of financial market distortions or because they are driven 
by political priorities. For example, relative price distortions may skew invest- 
ment toward the nontraded goods sector, therefore failing to enhance a coun- 
try’s ability to generate future trade surpluses. Under these circumstances, high 
levels of investment may not enhance su~tainability.~’  Among the episodes we 
consider, savings were extremely low in Chile in the run-up to the crisis. At 
the other extreme, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand had high savings and invest- 
ment rates. Savings were also low in Mexico in the early nineties. It is interest- 
ing to observe that in both Chile and Mexico 11, the low savings rates were not 
attributable to public sector imbalances, but rather to low private savings. In 
summary, all three crisis episodes are characterized by low savings, especidly 
by middle-income developing country standards.** 
A fourth factor is the fiscal balance. In  a pure debt neutrality case (Barro 
1974) the current account is independent of the time profile of  taxation, and 
therefore of the public sector deficit. Imperfect substitutability between private 
and public savings caused by,  for example, distortionary taxes and liquidity 
constraints, implies a positive correlation between budget deficits and current 
account deficits. The strength of this correlation may depend on the degree of 
development of domestic financial markets; in countries with underdeveloped 
or highly regulated financial markets we would expect to find stronger links 
between the fiscal stance and the current account balance, and therefore be- 
tween government budget solvency and current account su~tainability.~~ 
27. The Asian crisis has brought to the fore the importance of the mechanisms allocating savings 
to investment through financial intermediaries. See Krugman (1998) for a model in which moral 
hazard generated by  implicit or explicit government guarantees lead to overinvestment and to a 
crisis. 
28. In Colombia the level of national savings was low until 1984 but was raised considerably 
over the following period, thanks in particular to a large increase in public savings. In recent years 
savings have declined following financial liberalization, hut current account imbalances are not as 
large as, say, in the case of Mexico. For recent cross-sectional studies of determinants of savings, 
see Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1995) and Edwards (1995). 
29. The degree of private sector saving offset by a given increase in public sector saving may 
also depend on the level of public debt (Sutherland 1995).  With low public debt the current genera- 
tion could view a future debt stabilization policy (via fiscal surpluses) as remote; thus the future tax 
liabilities are perceived to be small, and fiscal adjustments affect aggregate demand and savings. 
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The evidence provided by  our sample suggests that the absence of  large 
fiscal imbalances ex ante does not imply that current account deficits will prove 
sustainable, as exemplified by  the cases of Chile and Mexico 11. Implicit or 
explicit government guarantees can lead to excessive external exposure on the 
part of the private sector, and eventually to a crisis. Ex post, the government is 
faced with large fiscal costs in the form of bailouts of banks and firms, as well 
as the shouldering by the budget of private external debt.30  Clearly, large fiscal 
imbalances, which were present in Mexico I, Malaysia I, Colombia I, and Thai- 
land I, raise fiscal sustainability issues and did therefore require a policy shift. 
Indeed, the main element of the policy reversal in the latter three cases con- 
sisted in a substantial reduction of the fiscal deficit; for all these countries, the 
increase in public savings raised the overall savings rate and contributed to the 
reduction of external imbalances. 
Drastic changes in the composition of capital flows took place between the 
late seventies to early eighties and the early nineties. During the late seventies 
and early eighties all the countries in our sample relied heavily on commercial 
bank borrowing in the form of syndicated loans, as well as on borrowing from 
official creditors. In contrast, the experience of the nineties is characterized by 
large private capital inflows, a sizable fraction of which took the form of for- 
eign direct investment and portfolio investment. Economic theory suggests that 
the degree of risk sharing, as well as the intensity of asymmetric information 
and enforcement problems are related to the composition of external liabilities 
(see the discussion in section 3.3). Table 3.4 reports some summary statistics 
on the level and composition of external liabilities and capital flows (see also 
figs. 3.7 and 3.8). 
Among these statistics, the cumulative value of current account imbalances 
as a fraction of GDP can be taken as an approximate measure of net external 
liabilities. This measure shows that the lower level of net external indebtedness 
during the nineties with respect to the eighties is mostly due to the relative 
importance of non-debt-creating capital inflows, such as foreign direct invest- 
ment, in recent years. This is particularly striking in the case of Malaysia, but 
is also evident from the cases of Mexico, Thailand, and (to a lesser degree) 
Colombia during the nineties3' A corollary of these developments is that inter- 
est payments on external debt constitute a declining fraction of net resource 
transfers associated with existing external liabilities, while profit repatriation 
takes a more important role. 
is at full force. The link between the twin deficits may therefore be stronger, the lower the level of 
public debt. Another implication of this line of reasoning is that the effects of fiscal stabilization 
on aggregate demand are weaker, the higher the public debt burden. 
30. The Asian crisis provides further evidence on this issue; the effective level of government 
debt increased substantially because of the high cost of restructuring a financial system saddled 
with bad loans, and the fiscal deficit is increased by the amount of the debt service, as well as by 
the output effects of the crisis. 
3  1. For Mexico I the net external liabilities measure is well below external debt (especially after 
1981), signaling the presence of capital flight. Chile 
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Table 3.4 also reports other debt composition factors, such as the fraction of 
short-term debt in total debt and the size of portfolio flows, which potentially 
play a role in determining the sustainability of external imbalances. There is a 
notion that vulnerability to external shocks and capital flow reversals is en- 
hanced when portfolio investment and short-term inflows account for most of 
capital inflows, as these are perceived to be potentially more volatile than long- 
term flows or foreign direct in~estment.~~  The ability of a country to withstand 
a reversal in short-term flows is in principle linked to the size of foreign ex- 
change reserves. In our limited sample, reserves were low with respect to short- 
term debt in both of Mexico’s episodes, as well as in Korea in the eighties. In 
the nineties, short-term debt is particularly high in Thailand, although reserves 
are high as well.33  In a study of currency collapses, Frankel and Rose (1996) 
find a weak correlation between debt composition variables and the probability 
of exchange rate crashes, but a significant negative correlation between the 
proportion of external liabilities accounted for by foreign direct investment and 
crash incidence. 
The lesson we draw from the individual country studies and from existing 
empirical evidence is that the composition of external liabilities may affect the 
vulnerability of a country to an external crisis but more data is needed to estab- 
lish a clear link between sources of  external financing and current account 
sustainability. For this purpose, the composition of external liabilities should 
not be considered in isolation, but rather together with the other macroeco- 
nomic, structural, and external factors highlighted in this section. 
3.6  Conclusions and Extensions 
Our interpretation of the evidence presented in this limited sample of coun- 
try episodes is that the likelihood of external crises has to be related to a com- 
posite set of macroeconomic and structural factors, rather than relying on the 
robustness of individual indicators (such as exchange rate overvaluation). Spe- 
cifically, the degree of openness, the level and flexibility of the exchange rate, 
and the intensity of external shocks interact with the servicing burden of ex- 
ternal obligations and the composition of  external liabilities in determining 
whether protracted current account balances are likely to result in external cri- 
ses. Clearly, the case study approach we adopted has limitations, such as poten- 
32. For theoretical arguments about the effects of short-term debt on the likelihood of balance- 
of-payments crises, see, e.g.,  Calvo (1997) and Cole and Kehoe (1996). With regard to capital 
flow volatility, however, Claessens, Dooley, and Warner (1995) find that in a sample of industrial 
and developing countries the statistical labels “short term” and “long term” in most cases do not 
provide information regarding the persistence and volatility of flows. 
33. After the end of our sample period short-term debt in Thailand increased further in relation 
to foreign exchange reserves. The refusal of foreign banks to roll over large short-term debt expo- 
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tial selectivity bias and collinearity between indicators, that formal statistical 
analysis on a larger sample of countries could address. The fact that we focus 
on current episodes also adds inference problems because of the potential for 
“peso problems” in the evaluation of indicators. 
In the analysis of section 3.5 we did not explicitly discuss two related capital 
market factors that are more difficult to quantify: the degree of capital account 
openness and the health of the financial system. For all countries we have con- 
sidered, the capital account is more open in the nineties than it was a decade 
earlier, although the  degree  of  liberalization differs  across countries. Re- 
maining controls on international capital movements are mainly designed to 
limit the size of capital inflows, as opposed to controls on capital outflows that 
were preponderant during the seventies and eighties (see Grilli and Milesi- 
Ferretti 1995 for an empirical analysis of determinants and effects of capital 
controls during this earlier period). In part, the more limited reliance on capital 
controls can be explained by the increased difficulty of enforcing effective lim- 
itations  on  international  capital  mobility.  Furthermore,  there  is  increased 
awareness of the distortions that capital controls cause by imposing a wedge 
between rates of return on capital in the domestic economy and  An 
open capital account should improve resource allocation and can also provide a 
disciplining device, since a policy inconsistency between, say, an expansionary 
monetary policy and a pegged exchange rate would result in the collapse of 
the peg. Furthermore, an open capital account could serve as a signal of  a 
country’s commitment to the pursuit of “sustainable” policies and thereby raise 
foreign investors’ perception of the country’s creditworthiness (see, e.g., Bar- 
tolini and Drazen 1997). On the other side, when the capital account is very 
open, de jure or de facto, a country is more vulnerable to sudden reversals in 
the direction of capital flows. This reversal may concern not only foreign capi- 
tal but also domestic capital.35  Furthermore, economic research and practical 
experience have also highlighted the potential dangers associated with poor 
financial supervision and a weak banking system when the capital account is 
open (see, e.g., Diaz-Alejandro 1985). Indeed, considerations pertaining to the 
health of  the financial system play an even more important role during the 
nineties because a larger fraction of  external funds are intermediated by  the 
domestic financial system with respect to the previous decade, when a large 
fraction of external borrowing was undertaken by the public sector. 
34. The degree of de facto opening of the capital account is endogenous and depends in particu- 
lar on the strength of the incentives to export capital (risk-adjusted rate of return differentials due 
to domestic policy misalignments, political instability, etc.). 
35. This is exemplified by  the experience of several Latin American countries (such as Argen- 
tina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) in the run-up to the debt crisis (see, e.g., Diaz-Alejandro 1985; 
Sachs 1985). For those countries, the level of “official” foreign debt at the time of the debt crisis 
was much higher than the cumulative value of past current account imbalances, indicating that 
the accumulation of debt had financed not only excess of imports over exports but also private 
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The degree of fragility of the financial system has played an important role 
in all the crises we have ~onsidered.~~  Weaknesses in banking system supervi- 
sion, distortions in the incentive structure of banks, the practice of  directed 
bank lending, and lack of competition within the banking sector and from non- 
bank financial institutions can imply inefficiencies in the intermediation of ex- 
ternal funds associated with large current account deficits. For a given size of 
current account imbalance, these inefficiencies make the economy more vul- 
nerable to changes in foreign investors’ sentiment or other shocks. As under- 
scored by  Goldstein (1996), a weak banking system is more vulnerable to a 
sudden reversal in capital flows when the exchange rate regime is not fle~ible.~’ 
Under these circumstances, monetary policy is “tied to the mast” because of 
the need to defend the exchange rate peg, thus limiting the ability of the central 
bank to exercise its role as a lender of last resort. The stability of the financial 
system remains an essential prerequisite for ensuring an appropriate macroeco- 
nomic response to potentially volatile capital flows. 
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237-53. 
COmIllent  Koichi Hamada 
This ambitious paper by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin addresses questions that are 
important from the standpoints of both theory and policy. How can a country 
continue to sustain its current account? What are the criteria for a sustainable 
growth path with international indebtedness? The paper devotes a substantial 
number of pages to these questions, but because these issues are intrinsically 
so difficult the authors solve only part of the problem. 
The authors discuss the basic tools for answering these questions: the per- 
manent income approach, the portfolio selection approach, and the asymmetric 
information approach. All of  them are well explained. What I would like to 
ask for, in addition to the careful explanation given for each component, is a 
perspective that integrates all three approaches. Since the economic universe 
is the same, all of  the approaches should be mutually consistent in an inte- 
grated model and could be adapted to each other. I am probably setting the 
authors a difficult task, a task that can hardly be achieved in one conference 
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paper. But I ask for it because an integrated perspective would give a clear 
understanding of each partial approach. 
The authors update the somewhat old-fashioned indicators of sustainability 
in terms of simple ratios, such as the debt service ratios and debt-income ratios 
used frequently in the practice of the Bretton Woods institutions. In my view, 
the optimal dynamic pattern of borrowing and lending of a nation can be ana- 
lyzed in an open growth model. Usually a country starts as a debtor, becomes 
a creditor, and then finally evolves into a mature creditor that runs a trade 
deficit but a current account surpEus because of  sufficient investment income 
from abroad. The process generates various changes in indicators of external 
viability. 
The difficulty of finding a proper indicator of interest payments ahead lies 
in the difficulty of finding a proper indicator of external viability, because we 
know the past and the present but do not know the future except for scheduled 
interest payments ahead. The test of the equality of the marginal rate of inter- 
temporal substitution between home and abroad is easily done, but the test of 
transversality conditions assuring the non-Ponzi condition is difficult. This 
kind of global condition can now only be tested by a unit root test, which gives 
only a weak sufficient condition for a non-Ponzi path. 
For more practical purposes, we have ratios of debt service to GNP, debt to 
exports, debt to GDP, and so forth. But most of the indexes are static because 
they are related to levels. We  should get to the changes-of-indebtedness in- 
dexes developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff and Cohen. Cohen’s index captures 
the speed with which the debt-export (GDP) ratio is changing and gives at least 
a cinematographic picture of the debt situation. 
As for the country section, I welcome the authors’ efforts to obtain and sort 
out relevant figures for Latin American and Asian countries. They are all in- 
structive. Since it is often difficult to obtain homogenous standardized data 
across countries, we should appreciate the authors’ efforts even more. My only 
criticism is that the explanations of  these tables are hardly accompanied by 
direct reference to the theoretical framework or by  explanations of economic 
mechanisms (rather than chronological explanations). 
I do not agree with the authors’ statement that indicators that use exports as 
the denominator are better than those that use GDP as the denominator. If the 
government could stop imports and the nation could still export the same way, 
then the export-denominated indexes would be meaningful. This is unrealistic. 
The same argument applies as well to indicators with government revenue in 
the denominator. Could the government immediately stop making public ex- 
penditures and repay the debt? Even the trade-related model developed by 
Rain would indicate that national indebtedness relative to income or GNP is 
a more appropriate index for external viability than what is defined relative to 
exports. Comparing C8te d‘Ivoire, which is very open, with Uganda, which is 
less open, will illustrate my point. Uganda would appear very precarious for 106  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
external viability and C6te d‘Ivoire would appear-contrary  to reality. I quite 
agree that the financial health of a country is an important characteristic used 
to assess the sustainability of debt.’ 
Comment  Andrew K. Rose 
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin have provided us with a valuable 
and illuminating paper. Not only have they provided a reasonable theoretical 
framework with which to understand current account swings; but they have 
gone the extra step to interpret the actual data. In particular, they  survey a 
number of countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia in two different time 
periods. Their particular focus is the macroeconomic and financial characteris- 
tics that could account for the actual swings in current accounts. They are to 
be commended for tackling an ambitious topic in a comprehensive fashion. 
Though Milesi-Ferretti and Razin have blazed the trail, much work remains 
to be done (as the authors readily acknowledge). I see a number of ways for- 
ward. 
First, it would be  useful to establish closer ties between the theoretical 
framework set forth by the authors and the data. For instance, it would be nice 
to assess the importance of asymmetric information in a quantitative way. Of 
course this is likely to be very difficult to do in practice, not least because 
market participants have incentives to try to minimize such problems. This may 
be one reason why foreign direct investment is used to such a high degree in 
Southeast Asia, and perhaps also why Asian countries tend to have been more 
open historically (since openness raises the importance of  trade sanctions). 
How important are the issues associated with portfolio diversification?  Is there 
any reason to be concerned that global capital market flows might diminish as 
the well-known “home market bias” disappears? 
Next, I feel it would be extremely useful for the literature to establish the 
value (or lack thereof) of accessible measures of current account solvency and 
sustainability that can actually be implemented. These concepts are extremely 
useful theoretically, but it would be nice to be able to assess their empirical 
merit (even in the context of the case study approach). 
The case study methodology employed by  Milesi-Ferretti and Razin has a 
number of  merits, primarily in terms of  flexibility. The case study approach 
allows the authors to look at many indicators and aspects without a narrow 
1. As an afterthought, this point has become especially valid with the recent financial fiascos 
among the Asian countries, including some of those studied by the authors. 
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scope. It is easy to focus on interesting events and issues. Here we focus on 10 
cases, eight macroeconomic variables, and extra financial variables. Neverthe- 
less, this flexibility does not come without a price. I think of  statistical work 
as being more restrictive but more disciplined than case studies. It is often 
difficult for the reader to absorb all the material in the case studies. As a result, 
we tend to look for common themes or threads (as do the authors). But testing 
the importance of common themes across observations is exactly what statisti- 
cal analysis does, although the latter is more formal. Further, the case study 
methodology allows one to ignore cases and variables that do not fit, resulting 
potentially in selection bias, collinearity, and specification error. Also, I some- 
times find it hard to think about raw data without a comparison set of bench- 
mark countries. For instance, is a 6 percent current account deficit “large”? 
Large compared to what? 
In the final analysis, I think of the case study empirics such as those in the 
paper as being useful as a first step toward more disciplined statistical and 
theoretical analysis guided by empirics. Since that is precisely what the authors 
have in mind, I applaud their choice of technique, while urging future authors 
to be more cautious. 
A number of  questions are raised by  this work. Among them, I would in- 
clude the following. 
1. What is the role played by capital controls in current account determina- 
tion? Should they be used if they work? Do they work? 
2. Is there a bottom line on the role of the exchange rate regime for coun- 
tries with potential current account difficulties? Do fixed rates allow for the 
appreciation needed to draw in capital during development more easily than 
floating rates? 
3. Is there a consensus on the (ir)relevance of the “Lawson thesis,” namely, 
that current account deficits are irrelevant and sustainable if accompanied by 
fiscal balance? 
4. Is there a special “Asia  effect”? Is the typical precariousness of  large 
Latin current accounts simply because they are usually associated with infla- 
tion stabilization? Or is it a thing of the past? 
5. Why are large current account deficits in developing countries different 
from those in the OECD? Many industrialized countries experience persistent 
large current account deficits; but crises do not appear. Is it good luck? Good 
policy? Or good capital markets? If the latter, why does financial liberalization 
often lead to trouble? 
I look forward to the views of the authors (and others) on these topics in the 
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